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Transnational crime of Chinese origin  







Introduction: attempt to define 
 
This chapter examines three areas in which we could encounter transna-
tional Chinese criminal activity in the European Union: traditional Chinese 
organised crime, also known as the Triads; Chinese criminal activity, en-
compassing sex trafficking and sexual exploitation; and Chinese criminal 
involvement in the Italian textile industry, which looks into the case of 
large-scale and rampant Chinese criminality in the city of Prato. While I 
attempt to de-mystify a number of assumptions about Chinese Triads and 
Chinese sex trafficking, concerns about criminal practices inside the textile 
industry are well supported by available evidence and this problem is there-
fore discussed in the following sections. 
 Defining ‘Chinese’ is not as clear as it seems. It can encompass citizens 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Republic of China (ROC, also 
known as Taiwan) and people of Chinese ethnicity abroad. All these can 
be perpetrators of crimes, active either in the EU (or in its relevant prox-
imity) or targeting victims in the EU, regardless of the perpetrators’ resi-
dence. The victims can also be people of Chinese ethnicity, who reside in 
the EU (legally or illegally), Chinese people abroad. It can also include EU 
citizens, companies, public services and even state institutions. 
 The link between the discussed topics lies in Chinese cultural features. 
It could be argued that a vast area of crimes by Chinese immigrants (e.g. 
human smuggling and labour trafficking, tax evasion, money laundering, 
                                                          
1  Jurij Novak, LLB, PhD Candidate, Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Ljubljana. 
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etc.) could be characterised as ‘culturally specific’, i.e. the cultural ele-
ments and specific traditions of the crimes in question are significant and 
should be considered when investigating any such crimes. 
  
 
False Chinese transnational crime:  
the ‘triad conspiracy’ and Chinese sex trafficking 
 
Chasing the phantom of Chinese Triads 
 
Studies of organised and transnational crime are often burdened by specu-
lative paradigms which have little, if any, basis in empirical evidence. They 
also fail to withstand even simple logical analyses. Such speculations often 
border on pure conjectures, political herd behaviour (Van Duyne and Ne-
lemans, 2011) and even romantic fantasy.  
 The so-called Chinese Triads are probably the most illustrative example 
of such unfounded research paradigms (Petta, 2017). Indeed, many Chi-
nese transnational crimes, including but not limited to human smuggling, 
sex trafficking and illicit drug trafficking, are attributed to Chinese Triads: 
“an imaginary mystery of a centralised global crime super-organisation” 
(ibidem). Since even the most avid fans of the triad conspiracy 
acknowledge that the Triads come only from Hong Kong and Macau, the 
application of the term “Chinese Triads” beyond these confines is grossly 
misleading. It would be equally erroneous to label Sicilian, Calabrian, and 
Neapolitan criminal traditions and OCGs as simply “Italian mafias”. It 
would completely disregard a realistic assumption that each such tradi-
tional and related criminal group is quite probably a specific criminal uni-
verse of its own. 
 Nevertheless, the term Chinese Triads often serves as a synonym for all 
Chinese organised and transnational crime groups. Because there is serious 
discrepancy between Chinese scholars, sinologists, and historians of China 
on the one hand and organised crime scholars on the other hand, some short 
clarification is required. 
 Secret societies tend to exist in almost every place and era: they may be 
religious, political or simply criminal or some combination of the three. It 
should be of no surprise that a country as vast as the Chinese empire had a 
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rich history of secret societies (the most legendary one is perhaps the White 
Lotus society that played an important part in organising a successful pop-
ular uprising against the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the 14th century) and 
clandestine brotherhoods. The latter were usually organised by migrants 
from the same area for mutual help. The most persistent of these societies 
were called Societies of Heaven and Earth (Chin. tian di hui), mentioned 
as early as 1761 (Murray, 1994) as a secret society of migrant workers from 
Fujian Province. These societies quickly developed a mythology about 
their founding, shrouded in mystery and obscure legends. They often as-
sumed a political identity, one of secret rebels against Manchu conquerors 
who established the Qing dynasty. Quite often, they were also involved in 
criminal activities, mostly smuggling wheat and salt down rivers in defi-
ance of state-imposed monopolies.  
 British colonial administrators in Shanghai and Hong Kong in the late 
19th century who were, following the fashion of those times, often mem-
bers of masonic lodges, interpreted the tradition of tian di hui through 
Western knowledge of masonic rituals, demonstrating little understanding 
for Chinese specifics. Tian di hui societies were viewed simply as an exotic 
parallel of masonic societies and hence named as ‘the Triads’ (Petta, 2017). 
The British colonialists, often paranoid of everything Chinese – going as 
far as being proudly ignorant of the Chinese language and culture – saw 
secret societies as a political threat and therefore outlawed all of them, in-
terpreting them as inherently criminal in nature. However, most of the so-
called triad societies had no criminal background. It is quite interesting to 





How should Chinese folklore and history be translated into the world of 
modern criminal Chinese Triads? It is not uncommon for criminal groups 
to develop their own mythology or to appropriate an existing one without 
any historical or even geographical relation to the group itself. The legends 
touting triad omnipotence exist even today and are believed by criminals, 
their victims, and by law enforcement alike. Therefore it is rather challeng-
ing to prove otherwise. Nevertheless, beliefs are not facts and should not 
be treated as such.  
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 So far, the only comprehensive and empirical study of Hong Kong Tri-
ads available in English is the monograph The Triads as Business by Yiu 
Kong Chu (2002) which debunks almost all Western myths about these 
types of organisations and their criminal capabilities. Chu’s research paints 
a picture of extremely local Organised Crime Groups (OCGs), limited to 
highly specific criminal activities (e.g. petty extortion of street vendors, 
tenant harassment aimed at vacating buildings, and night club protection) 
in Hong Kong and partially Macau. These criminal activities follow the 
specific environment of Hong Kong and Macau, characterised by high pop-
ulation density, coupled to the economic and cultural necessity of some 
services, such as illegal cheap labour and sex services. Hong Kong Triads 
are to some extent incorporated into the informal management of a large 
port city and show some similarities to the modus operandi of the Camorra 
clans in Naples or the organised crime families of the ‘Ndrangheta (Sergi, 
2015). 
 Hong Kong and Naples have a similar geographic configuration, i.e. 
both are port cities constructed on sloping terrain. This naturally leads to 
limited space in the city centres, while the suburbs (Secondigliano and 
Scampia in Naples, New Territories in Hong Kong) are far away, making 
them harder to govern. The Camorra gangs and the Hong Kong Triads are 
both involved in the profitable construction and real estate sector in various 
ways (persuading tenants to vacate premises marked for development, 
criminal activity related to public tenders, and supplying illegal workers), 
in smuggling and counterfeiting, in managing open-air illicit drug markets  
and in exploiting illegal immigrants (Chu, 2002; Behan, 2005; Saviano, 
2006). However, according to official crime statistics, Hong Kong is one 
of the safest cities in the world (Broadhurst et al., 2007; Hong Kong 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, 2016). Therefore we can conclude that the 
Triads exert much less influence on the local population and tend to be 
much less violent than the Camorra.2 Also, since Hong Kong’s political 
                                                          
2  According to the Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics (2016), there were 
only 22 homicides in Hong Kong with a population of more than 7 million 
people. In Naples City, which has slightly less than a million people, there were 
77 homicides (of which 38 were related to the Camorra) in 2016, a stark im-
provement when compared with the past (Beneduce, 2017). According to the 
only analysis of triad-related murders in Hong Kong (Lee at al., 2007) there 
were 124 such murders between 1989 and 1998. For comparison, there were 
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system remains firmly in the grip of Beijing, the political influence of the 
Triads, if any, is probably negligible. The absence of a political dimension 
to the Triads’ activities is in stark contrast to the Camorra and even more 
so to the ’Ndrangheta (see Sergi, 2015).3 
 According to Chu, Hong Kong Triads lack the ability, knowledge, and 
resources to become even a ‘mid-size player’ in transnational criminal ac-
tivities such as: large-scale smuggling of illicit drugs (heroin and metham-
phetamine from the Golden Triangle), human smuggling, cyber-crime, etc. 
Triad members also lack language skills (often not being able to speak even 
Mandarin Chinese), criminal skills (they are adept at street level crime but 
not capable of complex tax evasion and money laundering), and interna-
tional connections to be successful outside of Hong Kong. Furthermore, 
there is no rational reason for them to leave Hong Kong to which they have 
adapted quite well. Of course, some triad members do sometimes smuggle 
drugs or people; however, there is no evidence to suggest that these activ-
ities are done on behalf of a larger organisation. Membership of a triad 
group does not prohibit members from engaging in (usually small scale) 
criminal projects of their own. 
 As far as the EU is concerned, there is supposedly a minor triad pres-
ence in the UK, limited mostly to petty extortion of Chinese shopkeepers 
(Silverstone, 2011). No affiliation with larger triad groups in Hong Kong 
has been proven so far, allowing for the possibility that some ordinary Chi-
nese criminals assume a ‘pseudo-triad’ identity to be more successful, 
feared, and respected. In the continental EU, no triad presence has been 
detected. Since immigration from Hong Kong to the continental EU is neg-
ligible at best, we can safely assume that there is probably no triad presence 
of any kind. 
  
                                                          
311 Camorra-related murders in the province of Campania between the years 
1999 and 2003 (Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, 2005). 
3  But the Triads might have found a new political niche in suppressing Hong 
Kong pro-democracy movements. In 2014, numerous members of the Um-
brella movement were beaten by Triad-affiliated thugs-for-hire in the Mong-
kok area. See Varese and Wong, 2017. 
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The exotic allure of Chinese sex trafficking 
 
This section discusses the alleged sex trafficking of Chinese young women 
in the EU and attempts to de-mystify some assumptions. 
 Sex trafficking is a form of human trafficking. Numerous definitions of 
human trafficking are perhaps best summed up by Spencer (2014) who de-
fines it as “exploiting human beings commercially in ways that involve de-
grading treatment”. According to Article 3, paragraph (a) of the United 
Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
(Palermo Protocol), exploitation includes “at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs”.  
 It is obvious from the formulation of this provision that prostitution and 
other forms of sexual exploitation, i.e. sex trafficking, are considered the 
most important manifestations of human trafficking. If a person is involved 
in the sex business, consent to such activity or lack thereof are legally com-
pletely irrelevant, i.e. the Protocol goes so far that it considers a grown 
person, who is fully informed about going into sex business abroad and 
fully consents to it, is a victim of human trafficking (Hoyle et al., 2011).4   
 If international law equates sex trafficking with voluntary prostitution 
of migrant women, it is hardly a surprise that the mass media follows suit. 
Indeed, sex trafficking has often been presented as one of the most heinous 
crimes and appalling social problems of the day (see home pages of NGOs 
Shared Hope International, Polaris, End Slavery Now, and others). A vast 
body of literature and countless NGOs and government agencies exist and 
are dedicated to ‘eradicating’ this problem. 
 However, there are numerous objections to such widespread represen-
tation. Several authors (Weitzer, 2005, 2007; Zhang, 2009; Gozdziak and 
Bump, 2008; Spencer, 2014) have offered serious criticisms of basic as-
sumptions and typical narratives about sex trafficking and of flawed and 
unreliable research methods (e.g. the lack of random samples, very small 
                                                          
4  It seems that the legislators predicted that many victims would fake consent 
out of fear, but the main problem here is that the sex business often has no rigid 
roles, i.e. a prostitute might also act as a business intermediary (pimp) or even 
as a cashier. That means that her status as a victim or a victimiser may com-
pletely depend on temporary circumstances. 
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sample sizes, etc.). Critics also point to the lack of empirical research on 
the topic (especially Gozdziak and Bump, 2008). But we would also be 
remiss not to mention that the debate on human trafficking has become 
more balanced and nuanced during the last decade and that more attention 
has been paid to ‘non-sex’ trafficking (Alvarez and Alessi, 2011; Baker, 
2015; Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2016).   
 Nevertheless, even the most liberal minded people acknowledge that 
forced prostitution and sexual slavery are a serious crime. However, the 
official statistics suggest that these also highly uncommon.5 Isolated and 
extreme cases of forced prostitution, so-called ‘atrocity tales’ and are there-
fore used to argue against prostitution in every form, including voluntary 
and consensual sexual services for profit (again Weitzer, 2005, 2007; 
Zhang, 2009). 
 The sensationalist focus on examples of Chinese female immigrants, 
‘brutally enslaved’ or by some other means coerced or at least tricked into 
prostitution (e.g. Sui, 2017), perpetuates racist stereotypes in a similar way 
as beliefs in triad-controlled Chinatown underworlds. Horror stories about 
Chinese prostitutes in seedy massage parlours often coincide with similar 
stories about brutal and sadistic triad-affiliated pimps and brothel owners. 
 However, as suggested by Chin (2014; Finckenauer and Chin, 2010) in 
his qualitative empirical research of 149 Chinese immigrant sex workers 
in South-East Asia, Los Angeles, and New York, the reality of Chinese sex 
workers overseas might be entirely different.  
 China has a long and colourful tradition of prostitution, perhaps best 
immortalised in the classic erotic novel The Plum in the Golden Vase from 
the late Ming dynasty. As soon as the Communist People’s Republic of 
China instituted market-oriented reforms in the early 1980s, providing the 
population with some disposable income, thinly disguised brothels began 
to flourish again. Despite frequent crack-downs by police in mainland 
China, prostitution has remained a staple-element of Chinese nightlife and 
                                                          
5  E.g. According to Eurostat report ‘Trafficking in human beings’ from 2013, 
23.600 people were victims of human trafficking in the previous 3 years of 
which 62% were trafficked for sexual purposes. This calculation yields 14.632 
victims of sex trafficking in 3 years or 4.877 victims a year on average. How-
ever, by way of comparison, according to Eurostat, there were 5.211 murders 
in 2012. Using official data, we can only conclude that murder is a slightly 
more common crime in the EU than sex trafficking. Moral panic cannot be 
justified by referencing official statistics. See Chappell, 2013. 
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traditional entertainment (Zheng, 2009). The number of prostitutes in the 
People’s Republic of China is estimated to be in the range of 3 to 10 million 
women (Ebenstein and Sharygin, 2011).  
 Some of them also accept the risk and voluntarily become sex workers 
abroad so they can earn higher wages. Because of language barriers, Chi-
nese brothels abroad are mostly frequented by Chinese immigrants, Chi-
nese businessmen, and Chinese tourists. The relative isolation of Chinese 
prostitutes from the local population – typical for all low-skill blue collar 
Chinese immigrants, such as cooks, waiters, and vendors – serves only to 
fortify racist prejudices about Chinese patriarchal violence toward women. 
But according to Chin, almost all of the interviewed prostitutes knew them-
selves exactly what kind of work they were getting into abroad and were 
not tricked or coerced in any way. Some of them emigrated to work as 
masseuses but even they did not exclude sex work as a source of additional 
income. Contrary to the prevailing victim stereotype, the prostitutes in 
Chin’s research (2014) often emerge as independent and strong-willed 
women with considerable business acumen. Extrapolating from research 
findings, which state that Chinese prostitutes were neither exploited nor 
mistreated in South-East Asian developing countries with notoriously cor-
rupt or inept law enforcement or in the US, it is safe to assume they are 
normally not exploited or mistreated in the EU either except for serious 
cases of abuse which are made much of in the media. 
 Researching sex businesses (regardless of whether we focus on sex traf-
ficking or other forms) should abstain from ‘one-size-fits-all’ assumptions 
and be more attentive to cultural nuances. As it will be demonstrated in the 
following section, immigrants usually do not adopt the business models of 
receiving countries, but rather transplant their own. There is no reason to 
believe that the same assumption does not apply to sex business. Chinese 
prostitution abroad is different from, say, the notoriously brutal treatment 
of Albanian prostitutes. According to Arsovska (2015), this often begins 
with kidnappings, selling daughters into forced marriages, rape, etc. in the 
Albanian countryside and might have its roots in warrior-like patriarchal 
traditional values (ibidem). Research of Chinese prostitution should thus 
probably begin with empirical research in China and be careful to recog-
nize the cultural differences within China itself. 
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‘True’ Chinese transnational crime: immigrant crimes  
 
1. Crimes of Chinese immigrants in continental EU 
 
Background 
China has had a long and rich immigrant tradition. In 2010, the Chinese 
diaspora included over 40,3 million people, making it the third most nu-
merous and second only to the German and the Irish diaspora (Poston Jr 
and Wong, 2010). Most ‘overseas Chinese’ live in South-East Asia. In de-
veloped countries, the American Chinese community with more than 4 mil-
lion people (10% of global Chinese diaspora) is undoubtedly the largest, 
followed by Chinese living in the EU – more than 2 million people (5% of 
the global diaspora) (Gui, 2011), roughly the entire population of Slovenia. 
The number of Chinese immigrants from the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) is much lower when considering only PRC-born immigrants (with-
out their children): as of 2010, according to the UN estimates, there were 
8,3 million PRC-born Chinese immigrants officially registered outside 
China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan in 2013, accounting for only 
0,22% of the entire PRC population (Bofulin, 2014). The Chinese diaspora 
is growing at a rate of about 1,2% per year (Poston Jr and Wong, 2010). 
 However, saying ‘Chinese person’ can be vague and misleading. It 
could perhaps be argued that Europeans do not belong to a culture, as uni-
fied as the Chinese one, and therefore the adjective ‘European’ encom-
passes more variety than the adjective ‘Chinese’.  
 Out of the 1,4 billion people, less than 3% of Chinese have ever been 
tempted to emigrate from China in the last century. Most Chinese immi-
grants come from only three coastal provinces: Guangdong, Fujian, and 
Zhejiang. And then, even within one province, only a few counties, towns 
and cities provide the bulk of immigrants, whereas people from other 
places within the same province are not interested in leaving China at all. 
There is a subculture of immigration and even significant pressure on 
young people by their parents, relatives, and peers to emigrate and try their 
luck ‘overseas’.  
 In researching crimes by Chinese immigrants, it is therefore important 
to determine where in China the perpetrators and victims come from. 
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 Chinese immigration happened in three waves (Ding, 2010). The first 
wave started in the mid-19th century and ended around 1950. Chinese peo-
ple from Guangdong (Cantonese people) and Fujian province moved to 
South-East Asia and to the US.  
 The second wave, which lasted from 1950 to 1980, included Chinese 
people from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan who emigrated to the US, 
UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.  
 The third wave began after the Reform and Opening Up Policy in the 
People’s Republic of China in 1978, gaining increasing momentum in the 
1990s. Its main targets were the EU and its neighbouring states. These Chi-
nese immigrants also established a strong presence in Africa and Latin 
America. The third wave has been dominated by immigrants from Zhejiang 
province, especially from the coastal city of Wenzhou and its rural sur-
roundings. The correct term for these immigrants would be Wenzhounese.  
 In recent years, there has also been a significant rise of mostly female 
immigrants from Manchuria (the Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning prov-
inces). These women are drawn to France, where they work in the service 
industry. Their number is already estimated to be around 15.000. 
 
2. Origins of Chinese migrants in the EU and their characteris-
tics 
 
According to 2011 estimates (Latham and Wu, 2011), the EU member 
states with the highest number of Chinese immigrants are: the United King-
dom – 630.000; France – 540.000; Italy – 330.000; Spain – 170.000; Ger-
many – 170.000; and the Netherlands – 160.000 immigrants. The number 
of Chinese immigrants in the continental EU (excluding the UK) is esti-
mated to be around 1,75 million. It should be noted that most of these im-
migrants were born in the PRC, meaning Chinese immigrants in the EU 
represent a formidable 20 to 25% of the all the 8,3 million individuals that 
came to the continent during the third wave. Most of them are of Wen-
zhounese origin. Among the Wenzhounese, the immigrants from Qingtian 
are especially significant. 
 The Wenzhou prefecture (Chin. Wenzhou shi) of Zhejiang province is 
located 450 km south of Shanghai. Outside Wenzhou City, a large and 
modern industrial port, the region is a fragmented coastal area with a 
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mountainous rural hinterland, difficult to access even in times of modern 
transport. Agricultural yields are modest and the population has embraced 
the practice of running small family businesses since the early 19th cen-
tury.6 The tradition persisted underground even during the Cultural Revo-
lution. Coastal towns and villages in the Wenzhou prefecture have long 
been notorious for smuggling and even for petty piracy during periods of 
social instability. All this is criminologically relevant, because the Wen-
zhounese people have historically developed an attitude which sees any 
state power as an obstacle to their business goals or simply as a predator. 
 The rural element infuses the local Wenzhounese culture with a great 
deal of deep-rooted traditions and superstitions. People rely on resilient 
social networks of clans, fraternities, and old friends. The strength of these 
networks seems to be much more formidable than even traditional Chinese 
social connections called guanxi.7 Distrust of any and all outsiders is typi-
cal of the Chinese psyche (Bo, 1991) and Wenzhounese people are suspi-
cious of every other Chinese. Finally, the Wenzhounese speak a very dif-
ficult and untypical dialect of Chinese, incomprehensible even in neigh-
bouring towns and villages. In short, Wenzhou prefecture is mutatis mu-
tandis culturally somewhat similar to ‘scofflaw’ (lawless) areas’ in Europe, 
such as South Italy and Albania. 
 Within a larger Wenzhounese immigrant community, we find a signif-
icant group from Qingtian County (Chin. Qing tian xian), located 50 km 
from Wenzhou City. The Qingtianese maintain a separate but very strong 
                                                          
6  The area has been known for its stone carving prowess since ancient times. 
During colonisation by foreign super-powers in the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, the stone merchants established contacts with the first foreigners and 
started to emigrate to sell small stone figurines, first to Japan and then to 
France. There was a vibrant community of Wenzhounese merchants in Paris 
as early as the 1920s (Bofulin, 2014). 
7  Without going into too much nuances of the definition, guanxi (loosely trans-
lated as connections; the term with the same Chinese characters is also used in 
Japanese as kankei) are the Chinese cultural equivalent to Western notions of 
networking and social capital. They have some cultural specifics and yet it is 
doubtful to assume that such a modus operandi is uniquely Chinese, as argued 
by some Chinese scholars (see Wang, 2014). As the concept of guanxi is ap-
plied all over China, it alone cannot explain the economic successes of some 
areas. As Studwell (2010) points out, guanxi in China often do not work and 
can be highly unreliable, but guanxi networks are very efficient within the Chi-
nese diaspora in South-East Asia.  
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identity. As of 2010, the official statistics of Qingtian County give a pop-
ulation count of 336.500 people, 230.000 of which live abroad as immi-
grants (Bofulin, 2014). The remaining population is more or less concen-
trated in Qingtian Town which has grown from 20.000 to more than 
100.000 people.  
 Far from being a typical backwater town in the Chinese countryside, 
Qingtian Town is incredibly prosperous and cosmopolitan, even earning 
the nickname of ‘little Hong Kong’. Its immigrant community is of vital 
importance for the local economic development as official statistics for 
2009 state an income of $ 2.137 million (sic!) from migrant remittances 
alone (Bofulin, ibidem). If the estimate of 230.000 migrants is correct, that 
would mean that the average Qingtianese abroad remits more than $ 9.000 
annually. The Qingtianese group is generally present in Italy, Spain, and 
France. They also speak a specific dialect which is so different from Wen-
zhounese that the dialect speakers cannot understand each other. However, 
most Qingtianese people are also fluent in Wenzhounese, giving them the 
upper hand in collaborating with immigrant business circles from Wen-
zhou. 
 
3. Predicting typical crimes of Chinese immigrants 
 
To avoid prejudices and racist hysteria, it should be emphasised that Chi-
nese migrants’ crime rate all over the world is very low, especially for vi-
olent crimes. In most countries, including the US and Canada (Rumbaut et 
al., 2007) (but not Japan), the crime rate of Chinese immigrants is in fact 
lower than the crime rate of the domestic majority population.  
 Furthermore, crimes of Chinese immigrants – when they occur – are 
mostly harmful to the Chinese community itself and not to the local popu-
lation. The Chinese are not only the perpetrators of these crimes, they also 
comprise the bulk of the victims. Researching, predicting, preventing and 
punishing crimes of Chinese immigrants would thus primarily benefit Chi-
nese immigrants themselves. Typical crimes connected with Chinese im-
migrants are: 
▪ ‘Low skill’ crimes, which do not require expertise: smuggling (e.g. 
meat) and avoiding customs taxes and duties; importing or manufactur-
ing counterfeit goods (especially textile and leather); human smuggling 
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and clandestine immigration, usually for the purpose of illegal and un-
documented labour. 
▪ ‘High skill’ white-collar crimes which require special expertise: tax 
evasion, tax fraud, business fraud, investment visa fraud8, establishing 
fake ‘strawman’ companies to smuggle workers into the EU, and ex-
ploitation of migrant labour. 
 
Regretfully, the exploitation of Chinese migrant labour is pervasive in nu-
merous industries where Chinese migrants are traditionally employed, ei-
ther legally or illegally. Chinese owners of laundromats and restaurants 
consider this completely normal. It is especially common in the Italian tex-
tile industry (Calleri, 2016). Chinese workers are underpaid, work over-
time without compensation, are excluded from social security, denied 
leave, etc. In worse cases, they must also live and sleep in the factory, are 
denied freedom to leave the premises and face dangerous, even lethal 
working conditions, thus becoming slaves in all but name. This problem 
deserves to be explored in more detail.  
 
4.  Economic incentives for illegal labour exploitation:  
 the Wenzhou model  
 
Wenzhou City has been repeatedly declared “the most enterprising city in 
China”. It is the Chinese unofficial centre of shadow banking, land grab-
bing, and the monopolisation of light industries. E.g. 70% of plastic light-
ers in the world are made in Wenzhou (Ramzy, 2011). Its businessmen 
have repeatedly demonstrated vast experience with avoiding and corrupt-
ing law enforcement and bending the rules to their advantage. In China, 
they enjoy a reputation for dishonesty, trickery and an uncanny ability to 
haggle.9  
                                                          
8  In cases where investment in real estate is a prerequisite for getting an inves-
tor’s visa, it is not uncommon to sell the same real estate numerous times to 
many consecutive Chinese investors. Visas, issued for planned business pro-
jects which are supposed to create a certain number of new jobs, lend them-
selves to fraud even more easily. As the newest case of massive visa fraud in 
the US reveals, the investors proposed construction projects which were never 
built. The US were defrauded in the excess of $ 50 million in subsidies for 
construction projects (Bukhari, 2017). 
9  Such a reputation might not be entirely deserved and could also be the result 
of envy as Wenzhounese people are allegedly the most common group among 
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 The Wenzhounese are well versed in aggressively creating efficient 
low-cost, labour-intensive businesses in unsophisticated, ‘brute force’ 
ways. Their most typical tactic involves clusters of small family businesses 
which are located in the same area where they mutually cooperate to the 
detriment of local competition (Bongardt and Neves, 2007). Where small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the West are often hindered by inher-
itance procedures (the company must be divided among heirs or the oldest 
heir must pay the others their shares), this obstacle does not apply to a 
Wenzhou company. When the owner of the business passes away, the busi-
ness is not divided among heirs into smaller units but instead continues to 
be managed collectively by surviving family members. 
 Nevertheless, in spite of all its obvious advantages, the so-called Wen-
zhou business model is self-defeating overseas. The greatest weakness of 
Wenzhounese businessmen lies in two aspects of their business culture: (a) 
cost-cutting mentality (paying workers very low wages and producing low 
quality goods) and (b) an utter lack of formal education (often attending 
only primary school). In China, it is often said that Wenzhounese people 
never attempt a business that the owner or the investor cannot understand; 
so their entrepreneurial  complexity remains low. Investment into high tech 
gadgets, software, media, the internet and other goods and services with 
high added value is therefore discouraged. Due to the lack of education, 
the Wenzhounese are often also powerless to surmount language and cul-
tural barriers when faced with an international context. 
 In times of economic growth, when a group of Wenzhounese accumu-
lates enough capital to potentially upgrade their SME business to a large 
modern corporation, they are often simply incapable of coping with such 
sophistication. Their deep distrust of all outsiders also more or less ex-
cludes services from experts, such as lawyers, accountants, managers, con-
sultants and even interpreters. The cost-cutting mentality also prevents 
them from hiring skilled workers. Complex business ventures with inter-
national elements are therefore hobbled from the start and remain quite 
rare. Large profits, often in cash, can be invested only into real estate or 
                                                          
China’s nouveaux riches. They often buy the best real estate in large cities, 
(out-pricing the local population), while they lack and even intentionally ig-
nore formal education which is the unquestionable pillar of Chinese traditional 
values, reinforcing existing prejudices and fears. 
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into similar business ventures (restaurants, shops, and hotels), inevitably 
leading to saturation and stagnation. 
 In times of recession when demand is low, the Wenzhou model is bound 
to lead quickly to collapse because their source of income is based on pro-
ducing huge amounts of cheap goods with a very low profit margin. If costs 
cannot be controlled anymore by cutting, the business fails to generate a 
profit and is forced to close down or at least downsize. 
 Overall, the very economic essence of the Wenzhou model lies in ag-
gressive cost-cutting in various areas (labour, materials, taxes and other 
duties, administrative costs). Such a mentality inevitably produces strong 
incentives for various (cost-cutting) crimes: smuggling, tax evasion and tax 
fraud, and above all – labour exploitation and the violation of workers’ 
rights. 
 
5. Estimating the costs of illegal Chinese immigration 
 
It is not difficult to logically deduce the reasons why illegal migration is 
preferred to the legal alternative. Illegal migration can be: (1) cheaper; (2) 
quicker; (3) more convenient and ‘user friendly’ (less bureaucracy and red 
tape), and (4) ‘safer’ – from the point of view of an illegal immigrant who 
lacks access to information and legal knowledge.  
 There can be very few arguments against the fact that in the increasingly 
bureaucratic modern world, illegal immigration is often quicker and more 
convenient. Furthermore, even if illegal immigrants are caught by the au-
thorities, the same bureaucracy provides them with many options and op-
portunities (applying for asylum, government amnesties, etc.) to prolong 
their stay for many months, even years.  
 As for safety, the situation is objectively speaking quite the opposite, 
since many illegal immigrants fall victim to various kinds of abuse or even 
die on the way. It should, however, be emphasized that illegal immigrants 
have little to no knowledge about the country to which they intend to im-
migrate and do not speak the language of that country. Fear of everything 
foreign, which in the case of Chinese illegal immigrants often borders on 
paranoia, compels illegal immigrants to trust human smugglers and illegal 
employers of their community because they at least provide an illusion of 
protection against the hostile outside world. 
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 The only enigma remaining is the price of illegal immigration. Esti-
mates range from 10.000 to 75.000 or even 100.000 US dollars for smug-
gling a single Chinese illegal immigrant into a developed Western country. 
This information does not seem credible in the case of Wenzhounese and 
Qingtianese immigrants. By using other available information, it is possi-
ble to make a more realistic estimate. 
 The Wenzhounese immigration to the EU is strictly for economic rea-
sons, i.e. the opportunity to earn much higher wages than at home. We 
should therefore assume that the costs of immigration, legal or illegal, are 
a matter of rational economic calculation. If the immigrants immigrate for 
political (escaping state repression or religious persecution) or socio-eco-
nomic reasons (relocating abroad indefinitely in search of a better life for 
themselves and their children), they often accept very high, even unbeara-
ble costs. However, the immigration costs for Wenzhounese should only 
be considered as an investment to be returned to the investor over a certain 
period of time. 
 According to Qingtian County official estimates, an average Qing-
tianese immigrant remits $ 9.000 annually. Assuming that remittances 
from legal and illegal immigrants are of a similar amount, we can deduce 
that the yearly remittance should cover the immigration costs in a short 
time span, i.e. from one to three years. It is likewise well known that the 
most notorious Chinese human smuggler in the US, Chen Chui Ping alias 
Sister Ping, used a standard tariff of $ 18.000 per smuggled person. The 
standard price was such common knowledge among Chinese Americans 
that wives of illegal immigrants were nicknamed wan ba sao, ‘Ladies 
Eighteen Thousand’ (Zhang, 2007). From this information, we can deduce 
that the price of smuggling a single Chinese immigrant should be roughly 
equal to an average of two-year remittance: somewhere between 15.000 
and 20.000 dollars or euros.10  
 This price is highly competitive and can in fact be cheaper than the 
cheapest options available for legal immigration to the EU, i.e. establishing 
                                                          
10  This estimate is confirmed by the case of the Xiang (Hsiang) crime family 
which smuggled hundreds of illegal labourers into Prato and subsequently ter-
rorised them with ever increasing extortion demands. The initial fee was 
17.000 Euros, paid in three instalments. The criminal network of Xiang family 
was successfully broken by the Anti-mafia Investigative Division. See Calleri 
(2016). 
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a limited liability company in East Europe. For Chinese immigrants inter-
ested in the Italian, Austrian, and German markets, we can make an appro-
priate comparison with immigration costs to Slovenia. Slovenia is located 
the inside Schengen area, providing hassle-free access to Italy and Central 
Europe.  
 Establishing a limited liability company requires € 7.500 of initial cap-
ital and the ability to pay some notary and legal costs, immigration con-
sultants, consular fees, as well as the cost of travelling to the Slovenian 
consulate in Peking or Shanghai. All together this puts the final price tag 
at roughly € 10.000. However, in this case the residence permit must be 
prolonged every year. The priority immigration procedure, which guaran-
tees an automatic three-year residence permit with only one extension nec-
essary for 5 years requires an investment of € 30.000 investment (including 
€ 7.500 of initial capital) and at least € 3.000 for other expenses, putting 
the final price tag at a hefty € 33.000. Because this is one of the cheapest 




City of Prato as an example of Chinese immigrant 
crimes on a massive scale 
 
Prato is a city in Tuscany, located close to Florence. At least 30.000 to 
40.000 of its 191.000 inhabitants are estimated to be Chinese migrants 
(Latham and Wu, 2013). As of 31 December 2013, only 16.182 Chinese 
residents are legally registered (Johansen et al., 2015). Prato has been the 
heart of the Italian textile industry for decades. The first Chinese migrants 
from Wenzhou began to arrive in the 1990s and started working in small, 
family-owned textile factories. Slowly, the Wenzhounese community in 
Prato expanded as their companies started to increasingly monopolise the 
so-called fast fashion segment (Italian: pronto moda).  
 Nowadays, the Chinese businesses, mostly owned by Wenzhounese and 
Qingtianese families, directly or indirectly control approximately one third 
of the entire garment and textile turnover worth around € 4,5 billion annu-
ally and an additional 2,5 billion Euros in exports. Chinese businesses are 
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therefore expected to earn an aggregate income of more than 2 billion Eu-
ros. The orders for textile and garment production were outsourced to Prato 
from textile giants (Zhang, 2015), producing affordable and fashionable 
clothing (e.g. Zara and many others).  
 To remain competitive, i.e. cheaper and quicker than Italian companies 
and even production facilities overseas (China, Vietnam, Bangladesh), 
some Chinese textile businessmen have developed and perfected, as nu-
merous investigations by Italian law enforcement have revealed, increas-
ingly illegal and criminal business tactics. For the local textile industry, 
however, Prato did not represent a threat, but rather an opportunity of “out-
sourcing to China without going to China” (Cipriani, 2016). Cheap Chi-
nese fabrics were imported and often smuggled from China, while the final 
work was done by the meagrely paid Chinese workers themselves. 
 The city has the largest Chinatown in the entire EU. In proportion to its 
population roughly one fourth of the inhabitants are Chinese; since 2009, 
more than half of new-borns have been Chinese (Bressan and Krause, 
2014). Prato has in the last decade attracted considerable attention from 
scholars in migration, multi-culturalism, ethnography, Chinese studies, 
business models and business networks, public spaces, etc. (see Ceccagno, 
2003, 2012; Ottati, 2009, 2014; Santini et al., 2011; Chang, 2012; Nielsen 
et al., 2012; Barbu et al., 2013; Lan and Zhu, 2014; Lombardi and Sforzi, 
2016; Lazzeretti and Capone, 2017). However, virtually all of these anal-
yses remain in the ‘politically correct area’ and fail to mention that the 
district of Prato also suffers from inordinate levels of crime. According to 
a recent Transcrime analysis (Riccardi, 2017), Prato has comparable levels 
of organised crime infiltration to traditional ‘mafia strongholds’ in the 
South of Italy: Campania, Calabria, and Sicily.      
 The Antonino Caponnetto Anti-mafia foundation has identified three 
types of Chinese immigrant criminal associations in Prato and its surround-
ings (Calleri, 2016):  
1. A mafia-type association, according to the definition given in Article 
416 bis of the Italian Penal Code, mostly involved in human smuggling, 
extortion of prostitutes and to a lesser degree in illicit drug trafficking;  
2. Gangs of young Chinese delinquents, mostly involved in robberies and 
violent crime; 
3. So-called nuova mafia borghese, new bourgeois criminal groups of 
Chinese businessmen and entrepreneurs.  
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Contrary to expectation, the crimes of Chinese mafia-type associations and 
Chinese gangs are completely dwarfed in comparison to bourgeois crimi-
nal groups as demonstrated below. 
 In 2009, the Italian authorities conducted their first major operation 
against Chinese criminal entrepreneurs. Operation Economia Sicura saw 
the Italian Financial Guard (Guardia di Finanza) seize 50.000 counterfeit 
bags and discover hundreds of meters of fabrics used to make Louis Vuit-
ton and Gucci fashion accessories. When a team of labour inspectors raided 
a textile factory near Florence and discovered 70 illegal Chinese workers, 
living and working underground with their entire families, sharing same 
beds during their shifts, the team had to be assisted by the military (Calleri, 
2016). 
 This operation was followed by the most successful investigation so far. 
Codenamed Money2Money and once again conducted by the Financial 
Guard, it was finalised in July 2010 and resulted in the arrest and indict-
ment of 158 people, the confiscation of 181 pieces of real estate (many of 
them expensive villas) and 166 luxury cars, the majority being the Porsche 
brand, the freezing of 300 bank accounts, and the seizure of 73 companies. 
The value of seized assets was estimated to be around € 80 million. Money 
transfers, made by the indicted individuals to China, was always done in 
small amounts (so-called smurfing), but they amounted together to more 
than € 2,7 billion between 2006 and 2010 (Calleri, 2016). 
 It is quite probable that criminal Chinese entrepreneurs have been 
highly adept at avoiding Italian law enforcement. Therefore, a vast dark 
number of unreported  crime continues to exist. But even if we ignore this 
assumption, simply comparing the amount of unrecorded income, wired to 
China (€ 700 million), identified by various investigations, with the 
amount of the entire turnover of the Chinese textile businesses in Prato (€ 
2 billion) we get a disturbing picture of the deeply entrenched illegality. 
That means a third of the Chinese textile corporate income in Prato was 
illegally diverted.  
 Obviously, this is tax fraud on a massive scale, but tax crimes might be 
just the tip of the iceberg, since the main question is just how such high 
earnings were achieved in the first place? Even in times of the global fi-
nancial crisis when Italian businesses were struggling with the high costs 
of labour and materials, Chinese businesses managed to be immensely 
profitable. It is therefore possible to suspect other (economic) crimes to 
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raise profits: the illegal exploitation of Chinese workers, paying them much 
below the Italian minimum wage, avoiding social security contributions, 
buying materials on the black market or smuggling them from China.  
 Of course, it is almost impossible to give a final estimate of the propor-
tion of Chinese businesses in Prato which routinely and systematically en-
gage in illegal practices. Some commentaries (e.g. Cipriani, 2016) even 
state that only a minority of Chinese businesses work in compliance with 
Italian laws and regulations, as law compliance would make them uncom-
petitive. In Prato, it is well known that most Chinese-owned companies are 
established for a very short time span (Ceccagno, 2012). If the company 
closes because of shrinking profits, this is referred to as ‘natural death’. 
The opposite, ‘unnatural death’, happens if the company gets in trouble 
with the authorities and must pay hefty fines and taxes. Such a company 
files for bankruptcy and a new company emerges on the same address or 
nearby, like mushrooms from an underground mycelium (the Chinese po-
etically refer to it as ‘phoenix from the ashes’). There is also a widespread 
tactic of ‘name lending’, i.e. elderly Chinese or immigrants who intend to 
return to China simply lend their name as de iure owners of companies. 
When trouble arises, the name lender is nowhere to be found and the de 
facto owner simply ‘resets’ the business with another name lender. 
 
Some intermediate conclusions about Chinese crime in Prato 
The Chinatown in Prato and its garment and textile businesses have been 
and will continue to be an interesting and highly complex phenomenon 
with no simple, ‘quick fix’ solutions in sight. Its model of integration for 
Chinese immigrants has been highly praised by numerous observers as 
well as denounced as an abject failure where a few unscrupulous immigrant 
businessmen ruthlessly exploit their own countrymen and pay no taxes nor 
social contributions to the Italian state. The victims of such a system have 
mostly been the Chinese immigrants themselves, while many Italian locals 
– often assuming the role of the ‘victims’ in the local right-wing populist 
media – have substantially profited from the Chinese: as landlords, out-
sourcing companies, notaries, and attorneys. The situation is further com-
plicated by the observation that many of the Chinese exploited illegal 
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workers do not see themselves as victims11 but only as pursuers of the ‘Eu-
ropean dream’ (higher income) stuck in temporary hardship. Prato used to 
have the highest percentage of business owners among its Chinese popu-
lation, because literate people sometimes succeeded in working their way 
up to owning a small company. This implies that hope of a better life were 
not as far-fetched in the near past as they might seem today. What is more, 
the ideology of cultural relativism (e.g. “it is in the Chinese nature to work 
hard and patiently suffer”) has spread from scholars to the Chinese com-
munity itself. Once adopted it has been quite skilfully applied by its leaders 
who claim that Chinese migrants are victims of systematic discrimination, 
such that even Italian citizens of Chinese descent are treated as second 
class. They state that Chinese businesses should more or less be left alone 
in their self-imposed isolation from the dominant Italian population. These 
claims often carry a lot of truth and therefore cannot simply be dismissed 
as entirely unfounded. However, the culture and tradition of a certain group 
of immigrants, however ancient and rich it may be, does not guarantee any 
immunity from local laws and regulations. Finally, in spite of rampant il-
legality in Prato’s Chinatown, a significant number of Chinese businesses 
have nevertheless managed to respect laws, pay taxes, and remain compet-
itive. Such positive examples should lead the way in combating unethical 
and criminal business practices. 
 
 
Conclusion: phantoms of Chinese transnational crime, 
real crime and new areas of research 
 
The distinction between real and mostly exaggerated transnational crime is 
not purely academic but has negative practical implications as well. Chas-
ing criminal phantoms such as the Chinese Triads and fighting against 
overestimated social ills, such as sex trafficking, has logical consequences: 
                                                          
11  A factory of workers who were toiling 12 to 14 hours a day had no locks on 
the doors, meaning that the workers were free to leave at any time and therefore 
their exploitation cannot be regarded as forced labour. Indeed, nobody left. See 
documentary “Sirene: Indagine mafia cinese della Guardia di Finanza a 
Prato”, available on YouTube website: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rZraoVPWkk.  
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true problems, often persisting in plain sight, are neglected. Typical exam-
ple would involve the police “liberate” voluntary prostitutes, all the while 
the exploitation of underpaid illegal labour in Chinese-owned restaurants 
and textile factories continues unhindered. 
 It is therefore unsurprising that the case of Prato as the largest ‘Criminal 
enterprise’ perpetrated by Chinese immigrants in the entire EU, is much 
rarely covered by international media and even by scholars focusing on 
Chinese organised crime. Since Chinese immigrants tend to continue their 
isolation from mainstream society sometimes even into the 3rd generation, 
empirical criminological research and field work, conducted together with 
language and culture specialists are much needed. 
 However, it should be emphasised that transnational crime of Chinese 
origin also occurs in areas with no connection to Chinese immigrants. So 
far, we can mention three important examples.  
 The first one, which is gaining considerable media attention, is cyber-
crimes perpetrated by Chinese hackers. These often seem to be state-spon-
sored, but as freelancer attacks are becoming increasingly ‘popular’ as 
well.12 
 The second example is the manufacture of synthetic opiates, new psy-
choactive substances (NPS), and precursor chemicals by Chinese chemists 
(see US Department of the Treasury, 2014; United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2016; Riggs, 2017). Even though hard evidence is very 
difficult to obtain, numerous incidents point out that quite a few people and 
companies inside Chinese chemical and pharmaceutical industry are skil-
fully exploiting loopholes in the global prohibition regime without facing 
any serious response from the Chinese government. These problems de-
serve to be investigated in more depth and detail by scholars of organised 
crime. 
 Both of the aforementioned categories of crimes cannot be character-
ised as ‘culturally specific’ as their modus operandi is more or less unre-
lated to the perpetrators’ cultural environment. It therefore makes no sig-
nificant difference whether NPS are manufactured by the Chinese or by 
any other nationality. A Chinese cultural background is moreover mostly 
                                                          
12  The most recent worldwide attack was perpetrated using the WannaCry ran-
som ware crypto worm. Linguistic analysis of the ransom ware message sug-
gests Chinese speaking authors (Condra et al., 2017). 
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irrelevant when investigating hacking attacks, since they could also be per-
petrated by people from many other countries or even by international 
groups of cyber-criminals.  
 The last and very recent example of Chinese transnational crime are 
fraudulent call centres, mostly operated by Taiwanese nationals. So far it 
is unclear whether these call centres could also be considered ‘culturally 
specific’ (like the Nigerian “419” fraud, see Glickman, 2005) or whether 
the perpetrators simply copied successful fraud tactics and scripts from 
other countries. Surprisingly, even in criminally rather uneventful Slove-
nia, such a call centre was discovered and a vast criminal investigation, 
involving 150 policemen, followed (Pečarič, 2018). As the majority of the 
callers is stating that they were forced to call potential fraud victims, only 
six ring leaders have been arrested and are currently under investigation. 
Other callers are being assisted by the Slovenian Ministry of Interior as 
alleged victims of human trafficking. Interestingly, the representatives of 
the People’s Republic of China insist that this is a completely false claim 
and that the callers are only trying to abuse loopholes in the unclear human 
trafficking legislation.  
 Many of the discussed cases clearly illustrate the contradictions be-
tween Western and Chinese cultural understanding of victims and victim-
izers. If Chin’s empirical research (2014) is correct, Chinese prostitutes in 
the EU are not victims, however they are treated as such. If they also tem-
porarily work as pimps or cashiers, they can suddenly turn into victimizers. 
Quasi-slaves, working in Prato underground textile factories, are without 
doubt victims, but as, to paraphrase Buddhist thought, “prisoners of their 
own mind” they do not see themselves as being condemned to years or 
even decades of misery and debt slavery. Workers in fraudulent call centres 
simply declared themselves victims and were believed.  
 These complex cases are challenging established paradigms and narra-
tives of human trafficking (including sex trafficking). Obviously, there is 
a great need for empirical and more objective research of immigrant crim-
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